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ABSTRACT:
The everyday use of hydrogen in the transport sector requires high safety standards. Safety requirements
must be addressed as a key issue for fuel cell car development. Therefore, it becomes crucial to have
experimental data on hand in order to provide realistic and reliable risk assessment and to be able to really
know the extent of safety margins taken. In such a context, the National Institute of Industrial Environment
and Risks (INERIS) along with the French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), the French automotive
manufacturer PSA PEUGEOT CITROËN and the research Institute on unstable phenomena (IRPHE)
recently started a research programme entitled DRIVE. This programme aims at providing experimental and
numerical results for the safe design of hydrogen vehicles. Fields of investigation cover the whole range of
phenomena that can be encountered in hydrogen accidents, from leakage to dispersion, ignition and finally
combustion. The work programme and early results are presented in this article.
KEYWORDS: hydrogen vehicles, safety, accidental events, experiments
Motivations and main interest
The everyday use of hydrogen in the transport sector requires high safety standards. Safety requirements
must be addressed as a key issue for fuel cell car development. It is therefore a necessity to fully understand
and investigate explosion and fire hazards associated with the use of hydrogen and to come up with practical
and realistic means to control these hazards. Although the experience and safety record of hydrogen as an
industrial gas is significant, it turns out not to be applicable to the future decentralised use of moderate
quantities of hydrogen. Data specific to that use are becoming crucial in order to provide realistic risk
assessment and to be able to specify expected safety performances.
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Programme objectives
This project which gathers together industrial expertise of the car manufacturer PSA PEUGEOT CITROËN
as well as technical and scientific skills of CEA, IRPHE and the co-ordinator INERIS aims at providing
experimental and numerical results to better assess hazards when handling hydrogen onboard vehicles.
Results will contribute to strengthen risk assessment studies in terms of hazard quantification as well as to
propose innovative solutions for the handling of hydrogen in cars compatible with public use.
The work programme is split into 4 items: the automotive system, hydrogen dispersion, hydrogen ignition
and combustion and finally results dissemination. The second and the third items focus on the hazardous
phenomena one would consecutively encounter when dealing with hydrogen accidents. The accidental chain
is illustrated by the figure below.
Hydrogen safety onboard vehicle: point of view and expectations from the car manufacturer
Hydrogen vehicle must be as safe as conventional cars. However, the lack of hard data on hydrogen
hazards onboard vehicles as well as the absence of statistically relevant data for hydrogen vehicles used by
the public is a real challenge for designers who, at this stage, may be inclined to over-control hazards with
constraining safety barriers.
The list below indicates some of the safety challenges that face car manufacturers:
 Safe pressurised storage design (thermal insulation, use and location of pressure relief devices
(PRD), enclosed or open compartment for storage…) and location of the pressurised storage in
order to prevent burst due to thermal and mechanical aggressions as well as to control
consequences of accidental leakage or PRD releases.
 Adequate control of standing flames fed by minor undetected leaks,
 Appropriate equipment design (choice of material and technology) and location (segregation,,
enclosure,…) in order to control ignition sources whether mechanical, electrical or electrostatic in
normal operations,
 Safe handling of hydrogen purged outside vehicle,
 Effective control of explosive atmospheres in confined or semi-confined spaces on-board
vehicles (engine compartment) or outside the vehicle (underbody, garages…). That also includes
ensuring that hydrogen will never penetrates into the passenger compartment.
Aside from the items above, one of the great challenges consists in setting an appropriate limit to segregate
tolerable accidental releases versus unacceptable ones. Such a limit would then contribute to set the
expected performance of the leak detection and leak interruption systems whether based on atmospheric
detection or on direct measurement such as flow or pressure drops. Ideally, a vehicle should be able to run
without leak detection systems having in mind that reliability of such detection system is so far moderate and
that maintenance is rather constraining. Chronic leakage is also an issue since the no-leak objective does
not seem to be realistic. Therefore, upper tolerable limit should also be specified for chronic leakage along
with design measures to ensure that hydrogen can never accumulate to form an explosive mixture.
Finally, CFD tools currently and intensively used by car manufacturers to design vehicles (aerodynamic
studies for instance) should also be able to provide reliable results when computing normal or accidental
release scenarios for hydrogen vehicles.
Safe design practices should finally be shared among manufacturers to promote the high safety standard
expected for the public use of hydrogen.
Accidental and
chronic leakage
H2 build up and expansion
of explosive atmosphere
onboard or outside vehicle
Ignition
Hydrogen jet
flame
Explosion
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Detailed presentation of the work programme and early results
Work programme
This project started early 2006 in the framework of the first call for proposals of the National Research
Agency (ANR). It will last for three years. Its work programme is made of 4 main modules:
 vehicle safety,
 hydrogen release and dispersion,
 hydrogen ignition and combustion (explosion or jet flame),
 and finally results compilation and dissemination.
The vehicle safety module includes a thorough risk assessment in order to identify hazardous situations
(causes, consequences). Outputs from this module will shape the content of the experimental and modelling
work in terms of hazardous situations to investigate with the objective of obtaining better quantification and
therefore better risk assessment and risk control. The vehicle safety module that concentrates on hydrogen
equipment and potential ignition sources onboard vehicles goes down to component level.
Within the hydrogen release and dispersion module, we will then experimentally look at hydrogen component
leakage in order to quantify them. Both chronic and accidental hydrogen leakages, as well as hydrogen
emissions (purges, pressure relief systems) will be considered. These values will then serve as references to
build the test matrix for hydrogen releases (free and impinged) on board the vehicle as well as in confined
spaces.
These release experiments will be carried out with helium as well as with hydrogen. The size and location of
explosive atmospheres will be monitored for various leaking rate and location.
Within the third module, we will concentrate on hydrogen ignition with vehicle components as well on
hydrogen combustion (flame or explosion). Ignition potentiality of car components (fans, electronic cards,
electric engines, braking systems…) will be investigated through practical testing. In parallel, explosion
experiments will be undertaken in order to assess the destructive potential of explosive atmospheres (in
accordance with hydrogen dispersion findings) in more or less obstructed environments. In a later stage,
combustion tests will take place on board vehicles. Hydrogen flames will also be considered at two different
scales; on one hand, effect of large hydrogen flame resulting for instance from a PRD release and on the
other hand, standing flames fed by minor leaks. For the latter point we will look at the ease with which
ignition can occur as well as flame sustainability depending on upstream pressure and leaking orifice size.
Excessive fire hazards due to the use of hydrogen can possibly be more critical than explosive atmospheres
themselves that concentrate most of today’s concerns. In the frame of the last module, experimental learning
will be turned into practical graphs to facilitate risk quantification. Recommendations on best practices for
vehicle design will also be drafted. Topics such as maximum allowable explosive volume, control of ignition
sources and location of hydrogen components… will be addressed in final public reports. Results will be
discussed during dedicated seminars.
This project will not investigate the safety of high-pressure hydrogen storage in terms of potentiality for
catastrophic failure when exposed to mechanical aggression or external fire. Issues such as fuse location on
tanks or thermal insulation will not be looked at in the frame of this project. However, potential leaks as well
as PRD releases consequences (explosive atmosphere under vehicle, jet fire) will be experimentally
considered. Leakage during refuelling will not be considered either.
More detailed content and progress of some of the work themes is given below.
Work topics
Objectives, methodology, tools, basic background information and early results will be presented for each of
the topics below:
 vehicle risk assessment,
 leak quantification,
 hydrogen dispersion on board and outside the vehicle,
 hydrogen ignition by vehicle components,
 hydrogen explosion,
 & hydrogen flames.
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Vehicle risk assessment
Objective
Risk assessment helps to evaluate and demonstrate through a systematic and consistent approach that a
hydrogen vehicle whether of a prototypic or a series production type is as safe as a conventional one. Within
this project this early work will help us to select hazardous situations to be studied and therefore to shape the
experimental programme.
Steps
Usual risk assessment steps are the following:
 identify unwanted events and associated causes and consequences,
 evaluate their criticity,
 and take appropriate actions to bring risk down to an acceptable level.
Tools
Four tools are mainly used to contribute to the risk assessment studies: functional analysis preliminary risk
analysis, fault trees and then Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA).
First of all, a functional analysis was undertaken. It helps to identify system functions and associated internal
and external constrains. Then a preliminary risk assessment was carried out. This simple methodology helps
to highlight the most unwanted events and to initiate discussions on severity and severity levels. For each
vehicle mode (running, stand by, maintenance…) the following unwanted events are investigated:
 shift in internal system functions and system constrains,
 impact from the system on its environment,
 and then impact from the environment on the studied system.
All identified unwanted events were then ranked according to severity criteria. The severity scale consists of
four levels. The highest ones 4 and 3 are those further considered in the study. Level 4 is associated with
death or injury on people and level 3 means that the vehicle can no longer be used because of a break
down. Level 3 and 4 unwanted events were then further investigated using the fault tree methodology. This
graphical methodology helps to visualise steps and failure combinations that lead to the top unwanted event.
Finally, a failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) was carried out. This systematic and inductive
methodology helps:
 to assess consequences of component failures (loss or alteration of associated function) on the
vehicle and its user,
 to identify component failure modes that can impact safety,
 and finally to propose corrective safety actions in the course of the design process.
A typical FMEA table similar to the one used in the project is pictured below:
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(PRV)
Prevent
pressure above
11 bar
downstream
from the
pressure
reducer
Stuck open
after use /
partial
opening
Seizing /
bad
tightness
Significant leak
and emptying
of storage
outside the
vehicle – Loss
of fuel
Immediate
Fire and
explosion
hazard –
injury
potential
Pressure
sensor to
detect early
pressure build
up downstream
from the
pressure
reducer
- Early over pressure
detection before
PRV,
- Quantification of
event severity
….
Table 1: FMEA table used in the risk assessment process
Early results
Identified unwanted events when using hydrogen onboard vehicle include:
 fire onboard vehicles,
 explosive atmospheres and ignition wherever onboard or outside the vehicle,
 the burst of the pressurised tank,
 high pressure jets.
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All the selected unwanted events are linked either with the use of hydrogen or with the handling of
pressurised gas. Unwanted events associated with high voltage or other non specific hazards are not
considered in this programme
Leak quantification
Objective
The objective of this task consists in experimentally measuring chronic and accidental leak rates (external
aggression, human error…) associated with key components of the hydrogen feed line and the hydrogen
conversion system. Accidental leaking rates to be evaluated include likely situation such as bad fitting
(insufficient clamping), erroneous fitting, missing or damaged sealant. Ageing will be looked at through
repeated dismantling of hydrogen connections. Leak caused by organic failures of components (quality
issues, internal ageing) quantification will be forwarded to component manufacturers. Design related
hydrogen emissions (PEMFC purge, PRV…) will also be taken into consideration. Investigated pressures will
cover the full range from the 700 bar working pressure for the high-pressure line down to few bars for the
hydrogen conversion system. Both hydrogen and helium gas will be used in order to assess the
appropriateness to use helium for leak quantification.
These realistic and practical figures gained from these tests will serve as input parameters for further
hydrogen dispersion and combustion experiments. These values will also be of a great help for risk
assessment studies.
Steps
The study includes four main steps. The first one consists in extracting and referencing leak scenarios from
the risk assessment study. The next one will consist in selecting components and test conditions (pressure,
damage free / damaged equipment). Selection criteria include for instance likelihood and severity of leak,
lack of data from manufacturers or gas component not initially designed for hydrogen use. Then, tests will be
carried out with the experimental set up shown further down. Finally results will be recorded and analysed.
Background information
Literature shows that various vehicles related leak rates have been investigated in the frame of dispersion
experiments. As shown in table 2, these investigated rates vary from 0.5 g/min (BMW [1]) up to 100 g/min
(Cfcp1 [2]) with an average value around 10-20 g/min.  It is interesting to notice that these values vary in a
large domain. Besides, except for the BMW tests, there is not any obvious link between investigated cases
and specific component leakage.
Regarding component leakage the Cfcp document indicates that the fill up point and the pressure relief point
are considered as the only way for the hydrogen tank to leak out. As far as other components are concerned,
the pressure regulator, piping and fittings were considered as components able to leak out whatever the
operating pressure (high-pressure and low-pressure). The value of 20 CFM (12.77g/min), referenced in this
document, is based on the assumption that that the onboard computer is capable of shutting down hydrogen
flow upon receiving a signal detecting a flow larger than 20 CFM when the engine is off. The Japanese
regulation for hydrogen vehicle2 proposes a leak threshold of 11,8 g/min (or 131 L/min) that should not be
reached in case of leakage after vehicle collision. This leakage is assumed to have the same calorific value
as today’s admissible value for gasoline. However, associated explosive atmosphere and consequences
have not been taken into consideration. The same document indicates that helium can be used instead of
hydrogen for leak tests as long as a 1.33 multiplication factor of the leak volumetric flow is used.
Regarding purge management, the Japanese regulation indicates also that no purged gas in excess of 4% of
hydrogen concentration shall be discharged or leaked to the atmosphere.
As far as the GRPE Informal Group on Hydrogen/Fuel Cell Vehicles work is concerned [3], no maximum
allowable leakage value or leakage value to be detected is proposed.
The work carried out in the framework of the DRIVE project will propose some realistic data specific to
hydrogen components and hydrogen fittings. These data will enrich somehow empirical data proposed so
far.
1 California Fuel Cell Partnership
2 Attachment 100 – Technical standard for fuel systems of motor vehicles fueled by compressed hydrogen
gas
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Tools
Components will be connected to pressure sources according to the figure below. Components will be
placed inside a closed 2 m3 insulated sphere inside where both pressure and temperature are monitored.
Component leak rate measurement is directly linked to pressure variation inside the sphere.
Figure 1: Experimental set up for leak quantification
Early Results
At least, the following components will be tested: hydrogen connections, pressure regulator, phase
separator, hydrogen pump, solenoid valve & components made of polymeric or plastic type materials.
Hydrogen Dispersion on board and outside vehicle (confined spaces)
Objectives
The objectives of this study are to investigate, experimentally and numerically, different types of leaks and
the dispersion of hydrogen either inside the vehicle or outside the vehicle in the most critical situation, that is
when the vehicle is parked in an enclosed space such as a private garage. The mechanisms for the build-up
of a potentially explosive mixture of hydrogen and air will be studied in detail, and effects of confinement and
ventilation will be assessed.
Steps
The experimental programme will consist of leak and dispersion tests in a full-scale garage as well as on-
board a vehicle. Both helium and hydrogen will be used. The test matrix will be elaborated from the leak
quantification tests, the preliminary risk assessment study, and some pretest calculations using CFD
(Computational Fluid Dynamics) codes will be performed to optimise the instrumentation set-up (location,
number of sensors). After the tests have been performed, the CFD tools will be validated on a series of
experiments, including some involving passive or active ventilation. Finally, the CFD tools will be used to
perform parametric studies and to identify worse case scenarios and how they can be mitigated (for example
by design of passive or active ventilation).
Background information
The table below summarises past hydrogen leak hypotheses and dispersion experiments in confined
spaces.
Data source Experimental configuration andobjectives
Leak rate proposed
or investigated in
g/min
Remarks
Swain garage –
1998 [4] & [5]
Assess how should existing
garages be modified to make
them suitable for H2 vehicles
10.2 g/min Low exit velocity (0.1 m/s)
Swain hallway –
1999 [6} CFD validation 4.8 g/min Low exit velocity (0.1 m/s)
California fuel
cell Partnership -
July 2004 [2]
The objective was to numerically
evaluate consequences (explosive
atmosphere volume) of hydrogen
Residential garages :
5, 15, 20 CFM leak
(respectively 12.77,
The assumption is that the on-
board computer is capable of
shutting down hydrogen flow
Temperature probe
Opening 1
Opening 2
Purge line
Temperature probe
Pressure transducer inside
the sphere
Pressure
transducer
Hydrogen
compressor
(700 bar)
Component
tested for
hydrogen leak
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Data source Experimental configuration andobjectives
Leak rate proposed
or investigated in
g/min
Remarks
leakage in confined environment
such as garages.
Two undercarriage configurations
considered
38.30 and 51.07
g/mn) &
Maintenance and
service facilities :
continuous 24 and
36 CFM leak
(respectively 61.29
and 91.93 g/mn)
upon receiving a signal
detecting a flow larger than 20
cubic feet per minute (CFM)
flow, ‘leak’, when the vehicle is
dormant. This leak rate
corresponds to a fuel cell
power output of about 50 kW
JARI [7]
Examine the diffusion behaviour
of hydrogen in an enclosed space
with various release speed
Hydrogen was released
continuously from the center of
the box bottom surface
0,84 g/min or 10
L/min
It was found that with change
in release speed (0.1, 0.2 and
3.4 m/s (corresponding exit
diameters are 46, 33 and 8
mm respectively) there was a
moderate variation in the
horizontal hydrogen diffusion
along the bottom surface and
in the lift of the 4%+
combustible mixture
BMW tests [1]
BMW wanted to experimentally
demonstrate that maximum
leakage in a confined room
(garage) would not induce
hazardous explosive atmosphere
with minimum natural ventilation.
1g/min
0.5 g/min
1g/min is considered to be the
maximum escape volume of
hydrogen in the event of a
fault.
0,5 g/s concerns less severe
cases. Hydrogen is stored
under cryogenic form. These
values are based on hydrogen
boil off.
Motor Vehicle
Fire Research
Institute USA [8]
Assess consequences of
hydrogen released if ignited in the
vehicle underbody as well as in
the engine compartment
48 g/min & 24 g/min
through a 1.6 mm
orifice nozzle
No indication given on why
these data have been chosen.
Table 2: Hydrogen leak cases in confined spaces extracted from the literature
Compared with existing experiments and data, DRIVE will investigate wider leak rates and release
conditions spectrum with more elaborate measurement techniques, in terms of gas concentration and
velocity and turbulence measurements. The new tests will be the most detailed and finely instrumented tests
for the study of hydrogen leaks. The objective is clearly to produce data both for risk assessment purpose,
and to validate CFD tools, which are now well recognised to be potentially the most accurate and reliable
computational tool for assessing consequences of accident scenarios.
Tools
The development of a full-scale garage and a quasi non-intrusive (due to their small size) sensor network
(catharometric measurement type) is currently in progress. Mass flow controller of various ranges will be
used in order to control leak flow. Hydrogen or helium concentration will be measured with the help of the
catharometric sensors grid. Non intrusive velocimetry measurements will be undertaken through particle
image velocimetry (PIV) and Laser Doppler Velocimetry (LDV). Transparent walls will be mounted on the
garage to allow measurements. Ventilation will be managed with the help of either an extractor or a fan. The
dimensions of the garage are those of a typical European garage for a single vehicle, and it is fitted with an
overhead pivoting door. The garage will be fitted with vents which can provide either passive or active
ventilation or extraction.
Computational Fluid Dynamics tools will be used for pre-test calculations, as well as to analyse the tests
once the CFD codes have been completely validated. One of the CFD outputs that will be of most use for
safety assessment is the time-evolution of the volume of explosive atmosphere (for example the volume of
gas mixtures above 4% of H2). The effect of leak location, direction, impingement on nearby obstacles as
well as presence or absence of ventilation on the evolution of this cloud will be investigated in detail.
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Figure 2: Garage skeleton (left) and garage dimensions (right)
Early results
The first tests are scheduled in the second semester of 2006, and will first address simple release scenarios
with no obstacles and then release scenarios with a vehicle mock-up. Extensive work is under way to build
and test the experimental set up, as well as to test and calibrate the sensors, both under air/helium and
air/hydrogen flows.
Hydrogen ignition by vehicle components
Objective
The objective of this work is to assess the ignition potential of some of the electrical and mechanical
components and to identify best practices for the design and the positioning of vehicle components.
Steps
Though not applicable to vehicles, the same strategy as the one of the ATEX 94/9CE [9]  & ATEX 99/92CE
[10] is followed. Basically, it consists in demonstrating that components have no ignition potential under
normal circumstances whenever an explosive atmosphere can form accidentally.
The first step therefore consists in listing mechanical and electrical components in the vicinity of hydrogen
systems. Then, some of them will be selected to undertake ignition tests in dedicated chambers. Based on
results, recommendations will be made regarding the design and the location of the components.
Background information
In the course of this project, we have been looking at cross-experiences from natural gas vehicles (NGV) as
well as from industrial vehicles that could accidentally drive into an explosive atmosphere (fork lift trucks).
Regarding NGV vehicles, no recommendation at all is found regarding protection or segregation of electrical
equipment [11]. As far as forklift trucks are concerned (category 3 vehicle for type 2 zone), the EN 1755 [12]
standard gives a few hints which include:
 minimum distance to prevent mechanical frictions or limit speed at which friction can occur
(brakes, clutch,…),
 bounding of all mechanical parts to ensure same electric potential,
 enclosing of electrical equipment to limit combustible gas ingress whenever the forklift drives
through an explosive cloud,
 installing gas detection onboard forklift truck. A 10% LFL concentration triggers an alarm. A 25%
LFL concentration stops the forklift,
 and also, limiting maximum surface temperatures when in use.
Now, looking at GRPE [3] latest draft provisions, one could notice quite a few recommendations on electrical
equipment. That includes:
 preventing hydrogen ingress into power supply connections where hydrogen leaks are possible
(paragraph 14.11.4.),
 providing sufficient insulation of electrical components to ensure that no current passes through
hydrogen containing parts (paragraph 6.5.1)
 & ensuring that electrical connections and components in the gas tight housing are constructed
such that no sparks are generated (paragraph  14.10.3.)
External
dimensions
Internal
dimensions
Length (m) 5.84 5.76
Width (m) 3.04 2.69
High (m) 2.5 2.42
Volume (m3) 44.88 41.26
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Tools
Tests will be carried out inside an explosion chamber dedicated to test electrical or mechanical equipment.
The picture below features a typical test chamber.
Figure 3: Front view of a typical test chamber to test ignition potential of equipment
Early results
So far, the following components have been selected for practical testing:
 the hydrogen compartment fan,
 the electric motor that drives the vehicle,
 the electrical converter,
 and the braking system.
Moreover, some non-conductive material components have been selected in order to check whether or not
they can lead to an electrostatic ignition hazard.
Regarding early recommendations for the design of vehicle components in order to control ignition sources
in normal use, the following can be proposed so far:
Component References State of the art design to control of ignition sources
Braking system EN 1755[12]
- Blocks should be made of a combination of non-metallic materials and cast
iron or an equivalent material. Light alloys are not allowed. Non-metallic
materials should not contain more than 40% metal in weight and should be
made of powder or fine wires (sizes given in standard). Blocks should be
glued or pressed on brake shoes. Holes or assembly should not be found
on friction surfaces,
- Temperature should be monitored,
- And wear should be checked.
Fans EN 50021[13]
- IP10 rating on the output side and IP 20 rating on the input side,
- Distances between moving and fixed parts greater than 1/100 of the fan
diameter (at least between 1 and 5 mm),
- 3,5 J shock test without hazardous deformation (or 2 J if fans are physically
protected against shocks).
Sparkless drive
motors
EN 50021
[13]
- IP 54 rating,
- Dielectric strength test to ensure sufficient electric isolation,
- Expectations on electrical couplings,
- Minimum distance between rotor and stator to be implemented.
Table 3: State of the art design to control ignition sources for some key components
Hydrogen combustion
Objective
This work aims at defining maximum tolerable explosive volumes for various leakage environments and
providing straightforward pressure/effect prediction rules for risk assessment. Test results will also be useful
to evaluate the prediction potential of CFD tools.
Steps
This experimental programme will first investigate pressure effects caused by the ignition of moderate and
calibrated explosive volumes for various levels of confinement from free environment up to congested
environment similar to those we can find onboard vehicles. Pressure prediction rules will be derived from
these early tests. Then explosions will be carried out onboard vehicle following leakage flows and locations
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consistent with those found in the earlier work programme. These tests will also help us to evaluate the
destructive potential of onboard vehicle explosions.
Background information
Although not wanted, leaks will inevitably occur onboard vehicles. It is therefore a necessity to work on a
maximum allowable explosive volume with tolerable associated effects. Once this limit is set, it will be a
significant input to size safety barriers for leak detection and interruption. So far, the only “tolerable explosive
volume” we found come from the industry. The European guide document for the implementation of ATEX
99/92CE directive [10] indicates, independently of the combustible gas considered that:
 an unconfined explosive atmosphere should always be considered hazardous when its volume is
above 10 litres,
 and an explosive atmosphere in a closed room should always be considered hazardous when its
volume is greater than 1/10 000 of the room volume.
Other work [15] investigated the limit of acceptable explosive volumes in natural gas turbine casings. The
recommended safety criterion is that the natural gas flammable cloud volume should be less than 0.1% of
the net enclosure volume. In addition to the above condition on the allowable size of a flammable gas cloud
relative to the net enclosure volume, the flammable gas cloud volume should also be less than 1 m3 in all
cases, irrespective of the enclosure volume. Safety systems have to be designed (detection, ventilation) in
order to insure that these limits are never exceeded. One should mention that people would not be present
inside the enclosure volume but are expected to stand nearby. Proposed acceptable explosive volumes are
not susceptible to cause casing rupture and blast injuries.
Examples above illustrated confined and unconfined explosions as well as explosion with and without direct
exposure of people. These various cases will be taken into consideration.
Regarding existing data on explosion experiments for moderate and calibrated explosion volumes in more or
less confined environment, the review has not yet started. However, similar experiments will be carried out
by FZK3 in the framework of the HySafe network.
For explosion onboard vehicles, we can mention experiments carried out by the Motor Vehicle Fire Research
Institute USA [8] where they investigated hydrogen leakage in the engine compartment. They investigated
various release rate and ignition delay.  Test showed that the maximum engine compartment overpressure
was 220 mbar. This maximum overpressure that caused the hood to bend was obtained for a 64 sec release
of 51 g of hydrogen. Shorter released produced overpressure of 10 mbar to 152 mbar.
Tools
These tests are planed for 2007. The experimental set up has not been designed yet. Tests will most
probably be combined with those undertaken by FZK in the framework of the HySafe network.
Hydrogen flame
Objective
This work aims on one hand at providing data on hydrogen flame length and on hydrogen flame radiation for
some severe scenarios (significant leak under the hood, hydrogen escaping through the thermal fuse).
Besides these tests, less severe cases will be investigated in order to study conditions under which a
hydrogen flame cannot be sustained. Ease of ignition shall also be investigated for high and moderate
pressures with various leak orifices.  These latter cases address minor / non detectable leakage that do not
cause any explosion hazard but could however cause a significant fire hazard whenever the vehicle is
parked or driven.
Steps
The work programme includes both an experimental and a numerical part. The first step will consist in
selecting a set of realistic scenarios/situations to be investigated. The experimental set up for flame length
and flame radiation has not yet been designed. Regarding flame length, both free and impinged jets will be
looked at. Seeding will probably be used to visualise flames. As far as micro leaks are concerned, we will
look at leak orifices most probably below 1 mm for various values of pressure.
Background information
It has been established experimentally that hydrogen discharges through circular orifices larger than a critical
diameter sustains stable lifted flames irrespective of the reservoir pressure driving the release. At smaller
diameter however, stable burning will only be achieved at operating pressures higher than a particular,
diameter-dependant threshold [16].
3 Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe
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Regarding vehicle related literature contributions, we can mention two practical contributions to the topic.
First of all, we can mention the experimental work from the Motor Vehicle Fire Research Institute USA [8]
where jet flames in the engine compartment have been investigated.  Some more data was previously
released by the Japan Automobile Research Institute [7]. JARI compared for a given leakage rate                   
(11.8 g/min for hydrogen and 28.6 g/min for natural gas/methane) critical diameter under which a gas flame
was not sustained. They found out that the methane flame became no more viable with a rather large
diameter of 2.00 mm or less. On the other hand, the hydrogen flame was sustained at the leak orifice even
with a nozzle diameter of 1.0 mm. Authors concluded that the favourable stability of hydrogen flames is
advantageous as a means to avoid explosion. Needless to say that the 1 mm orifice considered is rather
large. Much smaller leak orifice could be expected without being noticed. They could eventually cause a fire
hazard. It is therefore necessary to investigate leak orifices smaller than 1 mm. The DRIVE project will
investigate these situations.
Moreover, this research institute also investigated the flame behaviour of hydrogen released from 350 bar
hydrogen tanks. They found out that the hydrogen flame released upwards reached its maximum height of 7-
8 meters in 5 to 10 seconds. This flame length is very significant and could cause severe hazards for cars
occupants as well as for rescue services. It is therefore of a prime importance to provide advice on how this
release should be dealt with (upward, downward under the vehicle…). The DRIVE project will also address
this issue within this work programme.
Results and dissemination
The DRIVE project aims at investigating experimentally and numerically hydrogen vehicle related accidental
scenarios in order to strengthen risk assessment as well as to promote safe hydrogen handling solution
onboard vehicle. Three documents will be produced:
 the first one will address hazard quantification results and hazard quantification tools for
hydrogen vehicles. Hazardous phenomena will be explained. Issues such as flame length or
explosive atmosphere volume versus pressure and diameter will be detailed,
 the second one will address best practices when using CFD tools to predict hydrogen behaviour
when released accidentally or under normal situation,
 and the final one will address best practices when handling hydrogen onboard vehicles. Its
content will include both generic risk assessment as well as best practices for the design of
hydrogen vehicles.
These results will be presented in the course of open seminars.
Conclusions
Field of investigation covers the all range of phenomena that can be encountered in hydrogen accidents from
leakage, to dispersion, ignition and finally combustion. This programme aims at providing experimental and
numerical results in order to provide realistic risk assessment and to be able to specify precisely expected
hydrogen vehicles safety performances. DRIVE outputs will be turned into practical graphs to facilitate risk
quantification. Recommendations on best practice vehicle design will also be drafted. Actually, topics such
as maximum allowable explosive volume, control of ignition sources and location of hydrogen components
will be addressed.
This project has just started. However preliminary reviews of existing experimental data and guidelines have
been performed, to better define the expected results of the project. These reviews and early thoughts and
findings represent important contributions to the elaboration of safety guidelines for hydrogen vehicles. We
can without any doubt consider today that DRIVE outputs will be of a great help for designing safe hydrogen
vehicles.
Authors would like to thank the French National Research Agency ANR, and its hydrogen programme PAN-
H, which financially supports this project.
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